Defence and promotion of desired state identity in Russia’s strategic narrative by Szostek, Joanna
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Szostek, J.  (2017) Defence and promotion of desired state identity in 
Russia’s strategic narrative. Geopolitics, 22(3), pp. 571-593. 
 
 
 
 
This is an accepted manuscript of the above article published by Taylor 
& Francis.  
 
There may be differences between this version and the published 
version. You are advised to consult the publishers’ version if you wish 
to cite from it. 
 
The published version is available: 
 doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1214910 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/167877/  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 30 August 2018 
 
 
This is the final pre-publication version of a manuscript to be published in Geopolitics 
Page 1 of 28 
 
Defence and promotion of desired state identity in 
Russia’s strategic narrative 
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ABSTRACT: This article examines how the Russian state promotes and protects its 
preferred self-identity, using the conceptual framework of ‘strategic narrative’. 
Nation-branding practices, including state-funded ‘mega-projects’ like the Sochi 
Olympics, have contributed to the narrative by characterising Russia as a 
welcoming, attractive destination. However, a more salient feature of Russia’s 
strategic narrative is intense ‘anti-Western’ and ‘anti-American’ political and 
media discourse, formulated to defend against rival, threatening narratives 
projected from other countries. Through analysis of official statements and state 
television content, the article demonstrates how determination to protect ‘Great 
Power’ and ‘European’ identities underlay Russia’s strategic narrative in 2014. It 
considers responses which the narrative has prompted, arguing that desired 
results in domestic reception have been achieved at the expense of unsatisfactory 
results internationally. Heavy-handed attacks on the identities of other states 
boost collective self-esteem among Russian citizens, but they fail to produce – and 
arguably obstruct – desired responses among foreign audiences.  
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For much of the Putin era, Russian foreign policy has been rooted in the perception of 
international relations as a ‘competitive struggle’ (konkurentnaya borba).1 In this struggle, 
Russians like to envision their country as one of the emerging powers which are challenging 
Western hegemony in the international system. Those who run Russia speak of ‘the West’ 
(Zapad), led by the USA, actively obstructing their country’s rise and pursuit of legitimate 
interests. From this Russian perspective, the global competitive struggle inevitably entails 
undermining one’s rivals as a means to strengthen one’s own position. 
Mass communication is considered by the Russian leadership to be a crucial arena of the 
competitive struggle. Proceeding from the belief that Western governments use Western 
media to attack and undermine Russia,2 the Russian leadership has worked to develop 
appropriate means of defence and counterattack. As set out in the Foreign Policy Concept of 
2013, Russia is committed to ‘creating instruments for influencing how it is perceived in the 
world’, ‘developing its own effective means of information influence on public opinion 
abroad’ and ‘counteracting information threats to its sovereignty and security’.3 The Russian 
state is striving to promote a positive narrative about itself to audiences both at home and 
abroad. At the same time, it is seeking to neutralize rival, critical narratives by denigrating 
those (mainly Western) countries in which the most strident criticism of Russia originates. In 
all these efforts the state is motivated at least in part by the desire for recognition – 
domestically and internationally – as a particular type of self.4 
This article examines the Russian state’s approach to promoting and protecting its preferred 
self-identity. It uses the conceptual framework of ‘strategic narratives’,5 which allows state-
led attacks on critical others and self-promotion via ‘nation-branding’ to be seen as different 
but related means to the same end. Drawing on Russian official statements and state TV 
news from summer 2014, the article demonstrates how the ‘anti-Western’ and ‘anti-
American’ plotlines of a strategic narrative served to defend the idea of Russia being a 
European great power. The article then considers two major state-funded projects – the 
Sochi Winter Olympics and the Skolkovo innovation hub – which have also contributed to 
Russia’s strategic narrative, being used to characterise Russia as a welcoming, modern 
country attractive to investors and visitors. Finally, the article looks at responses to the 
Russian state’s strategic narrative about its identity.  It argues that desired results in 
domestic reception of the narrative have been achieved at the expense of unsatisfactory 
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results internationally. Heavy-handed attacks on the identities of others states boost 
sentiments of collective self-esteem among Russian citizens, but they fail to produce – and 
arguably obstruct – desired responses among important audiences beyond Russia’s borders. 
The fact that the Russian leadership continues such attacks in the face of negative 
international responses does not mean it is unconcerned about the country’s international 
status. Rather, it reflects the fact that the Russian public and elite experience greater 
affirmation of their desired international status by defying Western criticism than by 
pursuing Western approval on Western terms. 
Conceptualising the projection of state identity: from soft power to strategic narratives 
The deliberate projection by a state of a particular self-identity is usually done with a view to 
exerting non-coercive influence beyond national borders. The literature which deals with 
non-coercive international influence has been dominated for more than two decades by the 
concept of ‘soft power’.6 Soft power, in Nye’s account, is the ability to affect others and 
obtain preferred outcomes by ‘framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive 
attraction’.7 It is understood as coming principally from a state’s ‘resources’ such as culture, 
political values and foreign policy, which are turned into soft power by ‘skilful conversion 
strategies’. Nye associates these strategies with practices of public diplomacy, including 
symbolic events, communication campaigns and long-term relationship-building through 
international exchanges, scholarships, conferences, and so forth. 
Nation-branding policies are considered soft power policies because one of their aims is to 
elicit a positive, emotional reaction from foreign audiences, generally in the hope of 
boosting foreign investment.8 However, nation-branding is not only about appealing to 
foreigners. It is also concerned domestically with communicating ‘values and identity 
narratives to citizens’, enhancing their self-esteem and making them ‘feel better about 
themselves’.9 This domestic dimension is obscured within the ‘soft power’ framework, which 
directs attention towards audiences in targeted states abroad, while largely ignoring 
audiences within the state doing the targeting. 
There are other recognised problems with using soft power as an analytical tool. In Nye’s 
writings, different kinds of ‘attractive power’ are conflated: the kind which ‘arises naturally’ 
from shared priorities and values, and the kind which is ‘produced’ by getting subjects to 
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change their priorities and values.10 The mechanisms underpinning soft power are further 
obscured by the fuzzy dividing line between power that is ‘hard’ and power that is ‘soft’ – a 
division of questionable usefulness. Soft power has been conceptualised such that its 
existence is hard if not impossible to trace empirically. It is envisioned as ‘a long-term 
process that should be barely noticeable’,11 but this raises doubts about the concept’s 
validity. Without some kind of evidence of soft power effects, how can one be sure it is 
powerful at all? Meanwhile, the tendency to sweepingly apply the soft power label to all 
international communicative resources is problematic because the latter can exert tangible 
effects on international relations which do not fit within the soft power framework – when a 
focus on ‘attraction’ is inappropriate. There has been great concern, for example, about 
Russian television having a divisive and destabilizing impact in Ukraine.12 The problem lies 
not so much in its capacity to make Russia seem ‘attractive’ to some Ukrainians, but rather 
its capacity to make Ukraine itself seem deeply ‘unattractive’ (since 2014 Russian TV 
channels have been describing the government in Kyiv as ‘fascists’ who seized power in an 
‘illegal coup’ and are now ‘bombing their own people’ in the East).13 Scholars and analysts 
who describe Russian mass media as a soft power tool are therefore perpetuating a 
misnomer,14 or at least encouraging a partial and distorted view of the media’s role in 
relations between Russia and its neighbours. 
In fact, the adjective ‘soft’ – connoting something benign and non-disruptive – is misleading 
when applied to other countries’ programmes of international persuasion/attraction too. As 
Price observes, so-called soft power approaches adopted by Western governments can be 
‘surprisingly aggressive’, perceived among the elites and wider societies of target states as 
‘hostile, debilitating intrusion’ which threatens established societal norms.15 A recent study 
interpreted wary reactions to Russian identity-projection in Ukraine as evidence that the 
Russian leadership ‘does not grasp’ how to exert genuine soft power,16 but this is missing a 
wider point. It seems that most governments (not to mention journalists and scholars) do 
not fully grasp that widely disseminated, politically motivated messages about identities and 
values are always likely to generate diverse responses (including some negative backlash), 
because audiences are diverse and the promotion of one set of values and identities may 
implicitly or explicitly detract from other sets to which certain groups feel strongly 
attached.17 
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Given the shortcomings in Nye’s writings, attempts have been made to critically 
reconceptualise soft power. Feklyunina, for instance, proposes a ‘social-constructivist take’, 
where the soft power of State A vis-à-vis State B depends on (a) how widely narratives of 
collective identity projected by the former are accepted or resisted in the latter, and (b) how 
much influence the receptive audiences have over policymaking.18 This is an improvement 
on previous conceptualizations since it emphasizes the heterogeneity of audiences and their 
agency in producing divergent interpretations of any given event or policy. Yet Feklyunina, 
like others before her,19 ultimately explains soft power in terms of the reception of 
narratives. It is unclear what ‘value-added’ is gained by translating the tangible reception of 
a state’s projected narratives into an assessment of its intangible (and misnamed) soft 
power. Feklyunina’s assertion that compatible narratives of collective identity generally 
equate to shared interests may also be a little overstated. Belarus provides some evidence 
to the contrary. The Belarusian and Russian leaderships have for years emphasised their 
countries’ ‘fraternal’ relationship rooted in a shared culture and historical experiences; few 
among their citizens would challenge that view. Yet consensus over a narrative of shared 
identity has not prevented periods of extremely antagonistic divergence in the two states’ 
narratives concerning other issues, especially in the economic sphere.20 Identities projected 
through narratives are an important element in the exercise of international influence, but 
they do not necessarily have explanatory power that is independent from or greater than 
other dimensions of narratives. 
Kiseleva provides an additional constructivist take on Russian soft power applied in the post-
Soviet context. She treats soft power as an important signifier in discourse, rather than a 
type of influence that can be gauged empirically.21  Her approach is helpful for 
understanding the Russian elite’s interest in soft power and their shifting understandings of 
it, but the empirical questions which she sidesteps remain of substantive interest and merit 
addressing. When states attempt to exert non-coercive influence through mass 
communication, how should their efforts be studied and how can the outcomes be assessed 
and explained, if not through the ‘soft power’ lens? 
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle propose the conceptual framework of strategic 
narratives to break the ‘straitjacket’ of soft power and advance research into international 
influence in the contemporary media environment.22 They define strategic narratives as a 
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form of communication through which political actors attempt to give meaning to the past, 
present and future in order to achieve political objectives. Strategic narratives, they argue, 
have the potential to shape behaviour domestically and internationally by structuring 
thought and action – by defining who ‘we’ are and what kind of order ‘we’ want. Strategic 
narratives may clash, with states trying to generate maximal support for their own narrative 
while undermining those of rivals. A narrative can be considered strategic if it integrates the 
interests and goals of its communicator, i.e. by suggesting a desired end state and how that 
might be achieved. 
According to the proposed framework, strategic narratives derive their power from working 
simultaneously at multiple points on a ‘spectrum of persuasion’.23 At the ‘thin’ end of the 
spectrum, a strategic narrative can convince rational actors to behave in a particular way. At 
the ‘thick’ end of the spectrum, a strategic narrative can structure the experience of 
international affairs, the identity of actors and the meaning of the system. The spectrum 
should not be understood as implying that strategic narratives come in thick or thin 
varieties. Rather, it implies that any strategic narrative has the potential to affect not only 
the conscious appraisal of different arguments, but also the subconscious, longer-term 
formation of interests.24 
The framework of strategic narrative thus offers a theoretical account of the relationship 
between communication and international influence that is more transparent and coherent 
than soft power. Importantly, it also allows for the fact that communication in international 
affairs is often a matter of contestation, not just soft or benign attraction. Marketing 
consultants may be employed to ‘softly’ improve and promote a country’s nation-brand, but 
such practices and their impact are best studied in the broader context of other discursive 
efforts (soft or otherwise) which all governments make to characterise their own country, 
other countries and the international system. 
The strategic narrative framework allocates identity an important place in the relationship 
between communication and international influence. As Brubaker and Cooper (among 
others) have pointed out, the term ‘identity’ carries a range of meanings, dependent on the 
analytical context in which it is used.25 In the context of communication and international 
influence we are concerned with identity as a shared understanding of the collective self, 
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where the collective self of principal interest is the state as an actor on the global stage. The 
strategic narrative framework emphasises that governments work purposively to shape that 
shared understanding domestically and internationally, projecting a characterisation of their 
own state which serves various strategic goals. No self can be characterised in isolation,26 so 
when forming and projecting a strategic narrative, governments inevitably characterise 
(ascribe identities to) other states as well. With governments around the world engaging in 
this process, generating narratives with characterisations that can be contradictory or at 
least rivals for limited attention, competition ensues to win the support of key audiences. 
References to ‘competitive identity’ have tended to occur in the context of attempts to win 
an economic edge over rivals. Certainly, a state may benefit economically if its strategic 
narrative and associated characterisations are accepted and widely reproduced. A state may, 
for example, attract foreign investors by successfully convincing them that its citizens are 
skilled and legal protections are sound. Such a success – achieved through rational argument 
– would fall at the ‘thin’ end of the spectrum of persuasion described by Miskimmon et al. 
Yet there is more at stake – both economically and politically – at the ‘thick’ end of the 
spectrum. Representatives of State A may, for example, emphasize a particular axis of 
division when defining threats in their strategic narrative (e.g. ‘we’ in democratic countries 
are threatened by ‘them’ in authoritarian countries). If audiences in State B internalize such 
a narrative and come to understand their own identity in State A’s terms (part of the 
democratic ‘we’), this may constrain them from perceiving threats and their own identity 
along other possible axes (e.g. ‘we’ in socially responsible countries are threatened by ‘them’ 
in free market capitalist countries). National policy priorities and international alliances are 
likely to be shaped accordingly. 
The potential for affective (i.e. emotional) dividends from successfully deploying a strategic 
narrative should be mentioned too. Identities have been described as something ‘we desire 
but can never fully attain’,27 as something states do not have but rather seek to realise.28 The 
process of realising an identity involves achieving its acceptance by salient actors,29  
expressed in their behaviour. Winning such acceptance can increase the self-esteem of those 
invested in the identity.30 Thus, a state’s struggle through strategic narrative to be 
recognised as a particular kind of self is driven simultaneously by the desire to achieve 
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concrete political and economic objectives and the desire for more abstract rewards – pride 
and prestige. 
Russian identity aspirations and the critical West 
For at least the past decade, the self-identity dominating the Russian state’s strategic 
narrative has been that of a great power and a strong, autonomous state.31 Increasing 
antagonism towards the West in Russian political discourse since the mid-2000s has been 
attributed to Western countries’ reluctance to treat Russia in line with the great power 
status which Russia’s leaders feel their country deserves.32 At the same time, Russian 
perceptions of a Western threat were fuelled by the ‘coloured revolutions’ and American 
unilateralism under George W. Bush.33 Some would say that these phenomena evoked a 
selfish fear in the Russian political elite – a fear that Western-backed regime change might 
lead to a loss of personal power and wealth. Yet the coloured revolutions and American 
unilateralism also posed a clear challenge to the Russian state’s desired self-identity because 
they exemplified Western disregard for Russia’s expected great power ‘rights’: a zone of 
‘privileged interests’ in the regional neighbourhood and a veto over major international 
security decisions. Western criticism of Russian democratic failings was similarly grating to 
Russians who perceived such ‘preaching’ as inappropriate condescension. 
The anti-Western flavour of Russia’s strategic narrative intensified prior to Putin’s re-election 
as president in March 2012. Large public protests which broke out over electoral fraud in 
December 2011 were interpreted by Putin and his supporters (at least in public) as a 
Western-backed plot.34 TV coverage of the trial of anti-Putin punk rockers Pussy Riot over 
summer 2012 further emphasized the idea of a Western conspiracy against Russia. Yablokov 
describes how state-aligned channels portrayed Pussy Riot’s protest in a Moscow cathedral 
as ‘an attempt on the part of Russia’s enemies from the West to destroy the Orthodox 
religion and thus deprive the Russian people of their identity’.35 
The 2012 surge in negativity about the West has been interpreted as a straightforward self-
preservation tactic by Russia’s vulnerable ruling elite, which manufactures foreign enemies 
to distract the masses from its own shortcomings and marginalise the opposition.36 This kind 
of analysis is focused on the ‘thin’ end of the spectrum of persuasion: it emphasises the 
Russian elite’s desire to exert behavioural power over the population, persuading rational 
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citizens to conclude that supporting the opposition would be unwise. Yet many in Russia’s 
ruling elite most likely believe they are serving the national interest, not just personal 
interests, by keeping a tight hold on power in the face of domestic and international 
pressures. The idea that a great power must act and develop autonomously has deep roots 
in Russia. The domestic upheaval and decline that coincided with Russia’s turn to the West in 
the 1990s did little to dispel the impression that Russia is better off resisting Western 
influence and calls to democratize. The fact that such ideas are currently used instrumentally 
to bolster support for Russia’s incumbent authorities should not obscure the fact that such 
ideas have also been internalized among those in authority and thus influence the direction 
of policy. Plotlines in Russia’s strategic narrative which emphasise rivalry with the West have 
a constitutive effect on interests and collective identity among the elite and the public alike, 
which means the narrative’s power is also of the structuring kind, at the ‘thick’ end of the 
spectrum of persuasion. 
‘The West’ (‘Zapad’) has a high profile in Russian political and media discourse, but so does 
‘Europe’ (‘Yevropa’) – and the distinction between the two needs to be underlined. Despite 
referring to overlapping groups of states, ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ are signifiers filled with 
quite different geopolitical meanings.37 In recent years the West is has primarily been 
imagined in the context of international affairs as an entity from which Russia is excluded – 
‘a community of states separate from Russia’, which is dominated by Russia’s rival, the 
United States of America.38  Europe, in contrast, is an entity to which many Russians still 
imagine their nation culturally connected.39 The question of whether Russia is ‘European’ 
has been a matter of debate for centuries.40 When studying Russian geopolitical 
imaginations in the early 2000s, O’Loughlin and colleagues found that some 15 per cent of 
survey respondents ‘definitely’ considered Russia a European country; a further 29 per cent 
felt it was ‘mostly European’ while 36 per cent felt it was ‘equally European and Asian’.41 The 
2001 ‘Westward turn’ in Russian foreign policy was deemed politically ‘risky’, however, 
because the Russian public understands the West as a US-led bloc and perceptions of the 
United States, although fluctuating with events and contingent on context, are consistently 
marked by high levels of suspicion.42 
There is similar ambiguity in how Russia’s political leadership speaks of the West, Europe 
and their constituent countries.43 Even during the rockiest periods of relations Putin has 
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consistently advocated closer ties with European states located in the West. The Russian 
leadership has described Russia as ‘unambiguously a European state and part of European 
civilisation’, even if its vision of a greater Europe is not widely appreciated beyond Russian 
borders.44 Writing in the mid-1990s, Neumann argued that the Russian state had 
traditionally claimed to represent ‘true’ Europe, in opposition to a ‘false’ Europe that has lost 
its values (‘false’ Europe is blamed for the existence of bilateral tensions).45 
Although contested, a European identity thus ‘resonates deeply’ in Russian society and is 
desired among the Russian elite.46 The following section demonstrates how Russia’s strategic 
narrative worked to protect and reify both the ‘European’ and ‘great power’ aspects of the 
state’s preferred self-identity during 2014. 
An ‘anti-American’, ‘anti-Western’, but not ‘anti-European’ strategic narrative  
The analysis presented below draws on official statements made by the Russian president 
and foreign minister (41 separate transcripts and texts published on kremlin.ru and mid.ru) 
and Russian TV news (nine episodes of the popular 90-minute news and analysis programme 
Vesti Nedeli, broadcast each Sunday evening on state channel Rossiya 1) from June and July 
2014. The period under study was a time of extremely strained relations between Russia and 
Western countries due to the conflict in Ukraine: Russia was facing condemnation in 
Washington and most European capitals for its annexation of Crimea and its support for 
rebel fighters in the Donbas region. Analysis focused on how the collective West (‘Zapad’, 
‘zapadnyye strany’) and its various constituent states (including the USA, the UK, France, 
Germany and others) were characterised, and on plotlines in which they were referenced. 
Characterisation and plotlines are in fact two sides of the same coin, as the character of 
actors in a narrative are brought out by their actions which in aggregate constitute the plot. 
The texts were coded and analysed qualitatively using the CAQDAS tool Atlas.ti to identify 
frequently recurring elements. Translation of the presented quotes from Russian into English 
was done by the author. 
Hypocrisy was among the characteristics most often attributed to the West collectively and 
to individual Western states in both Russian official statements and media commentary. 
Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Vesti Nedeli journalists all regularly mentioned 
Western and American ‘double standards’. Consider the following examples: 
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‘There are hardly any of our Russian troops abroad. But American troops are 
abroad everywhere... Everywhere they take part in settling the fates of other 
nations while they are thousands of kilometres from their own border. So to say 
that we are violating something is very strange on the part of our American 
partners.’47 
‘[Former] US President Woodrow Wilson… proposed that democracy and 
national self-determination should be considered the highest values in the post-
war world instead of national interests. But that was just for export. Nobody had 
cancelled the greed of the Americans and their friends the English. As for 
democracy, the Americans calmly continued to hang Negroes, so to speak, and 
there was no mention of self-determination for Native Americans. Meanwhile, 
the USA has claimed the right to judge everyone by its own very flexible pattern 
for a hundred years.’48 
Characterising Western states as hypocritical helps to defend Russia’s great power identity in 
more than one respect. On the one hand, when Russian actions (such as the deployment of 
troops abroad) are justified by reference to ‘similar’ American actions, it implies that Russia 
is acting as great powers do – for few doubt the USA’s great power status. On the other 
hand, such statements underline that Russia is acting regardless of international 
protestations – emphasizing that Russia has the great power strength necessary to defy rules 
set by others.  Meanwhile, the validity of international protestations is undermined by the 
insistence that those protesting have only their own selfish interests at heart – not any kind 
of moral values. The narrative preserves the quality of righteousness for Russia’s identity by 
denying it in the identity of critical others. 
Russian TV news goes further than Russian official statements in characterising Western 
states and their representatives as not just hypocritical, but risible and foolish. Vesti Nedeli 
repeatedly mocked US State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki, claiming, for example, 
that internet users had adopted the word ‘psaking’ to mean issuing categorical statements 
without first checking their accuracy.49 When Putin gave an interview to French journalists, 
the Vesti Nedeli presenter said the Russian president had ‘patiently and politely engaged in 
tackling illiteracy, as if warming up ahead of meetings with colleagues from America and 
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Europe’.50 The implication is clearly that negative characterisations of Russia originating from 
such sources are not credible. 
Criminality and immorality are likewise emphasized as longstanding Western – or specifically 
American – characteristics in Russian TV news. Over the summer US ‘war crimes’ in Ukraine 
were highlighted regularly by Vesti Nedeli, and the programme drew multiple parallels with 
past events to make its case. On 15 June, for instance, the presenter claimed: 
‘Ten years ago the Americans used white phosphorous against people in the Iraqi 
town of Fallujah. Afterwards the White House lied that it hadn’t done so… Now 
the USA is covering up its accomplices in the criminal deployment of incendiary 
ammunition in Ukraine.’51 
Other techniques for establishing America as the ‘bad guy’ of international politics included 
references to popular (American) culture. On 1 June the Vesti Nedeli presenter spent a long 
time analysing Obama’s foreign policy speech at the West Point military academy. Images of 
Obama addressing neat rows of servicemen and women were loudly accompanied by the 
Imperial March (Darth Vader’s theme) from the Star Wars movies. As Obama spoke of his 
readiness to ‘use military force, unilaterally if necessary’, the presenter described the 
footage as resembling ‘another planet’, arguing that the USA was suffering from 
‘paraphrenia’, a condition which combines ‘megalomania and delusions of persecution’.52  
Such extreme media attacks on the USA perhaps pertain more to the Russian leadership’s 
goal of legitimising its stance on Ukraine than the defence of Russian self-identity. However, 
it is noteworthy that charges of moral corruption tend to be directed at the USA without 
much reference to its European allies. The UK more than others is mentioned as an 
accomplice in US ‘crimes’, but even the British are portrayed primarily as American stooges 
with a lesser degree of responsibility. On 6 July, for example, Vesti Nedeli’s presenter 
commented: 
‘What is the foreign policy line of England nowadays?53 What is its strategy, its 
tactics? You will be surprised: it does not have the first, second or third. The 
entire plan is to completely lay under the USA, to dissolve in the USA, to 
completely give its sovereignty to the Americans.’54 
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The USA generating the world’s problems while European states are (to varying degrees) led 
astray by US influence is a prominent plotline in the Russian narrative which serves to 
protect the European component of the Russian identity. It is projected clearly in official 
statements and TV news, as the following examples illustrate: 
‘All this is happening despite the obvious and objective advantages which both 
parts of the European continent could enjoy if our technologies, resources and 
human capital were united. To a well-known degree, this contradiction can be 
explained by the fact that the policy of restricting Russia’s possibilities is led 
primarily the USA, not the European powers.’55 
‘The aim of their [French and German] mediation [over Ukraine] is the protection 
of their own economies from sanctions against Russia, which are being forced 
through by the USA to weaken the Europeans along with the Russians and get 
them hooked on their shale gas.’56 
This plotline is used to suggest that Russia and Europe would enjoy a close and untroubled 
relationship were it not for American interference. Tensions with European countries can 
thus be accounted for without having to acknowledge any fundamental differences that 
might threaten the European-ness of Russia’s self. 
Differences between European states are accentuated with particular reference to their 
degree of subordination to US interests. Thus, the European Union’s Eastern Partnership 
policy to build closer ties with Ukraine (and other post-Soviet states) had been initiated by 
‘members of the EU which are extremely loyal to the USA’, Lavrov argued.57 After meeting 
the Finnish premier, Lavrov expressed hope that Brussels would ‘heed the voice of the 
majority of EU members who see the situation sensibly and do not want a confrontation’.58 
Finland, he said, was ‘part of this camp’. Similar statements were made about Austria and 
Slovenia after bilateral meetings with those countries’ representatives. In contrast, the UK 
was characterised by Vesti Nedeli as the USA’s ‘Trojan horse’ in Europe.59 
As for Germany and France, these are the countries which – in the Russian narrative – the 
USA is particularly desperate to prevent drawing closer to Russia. Historical parallels are 
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used to undergird this idea. For instance, around the anniversary of the outbreak of World 
War I Vesti Nedeli reported: 
‘Then, as now, Germany and Russia were acquiring strength. With their peaceful 
cooperation, the old world had every chance for prosperity and influence. Then, 
as now, the English and Americans had a common goal – to put discord between 
Russia and Germany and in doing so, exhaust them. Then, as now, willingness to 
destroy part of the Orthodox world was used to bring Russia into a big war. Then, 
it was Serbia, now it is eastern Ukraine. In the end, both then and now, England 
and the USA seem to be on the sidelines, but dream of using the results of the 
fight in their interests.’60 
Strategic narratives ‘integrate interests and goals – they articulate end states and suggest 
how to get there’.61 Three dominant plotlines in Russia’s strategic narrative point particularly 
to the Russian leadership’s goals vis-à-vis Western countries. The first relates to Western 
‘interference’ causing instability around the world. This plotline situates unrest and violence 
in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere all within the same 
explanatory paradigm: the West, led by the USA, gets involved then countries fall apart. The 
resolution proposed – either implicitly or explicitly – is for the West, above all the USA, to 
adopt a less interventionist foreign policy. 
Russia’s desire to see the USA less involved in the domestic affairs of other states relates 
particularly to Ukraine and the post-Soviet region, but extends similarly to parts of the world 
where Russia’s comfortable and profitable dealings with entrenched autocratic leaders 
(Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, Bashar al-Assad) have been disrupted by American 
support for such leaders’ removal. 
A second goal-oriented plotline relates to the West, above all the USA, seeking global 
dominance and acting without due consultation with others. The logical resolution to this 
plotline favoured by the Russian leadership is to grant non-Western countries such as Russia 
(or perhaps more accurately, Russia and those who agree with Russia) a greater say in 
international decision-making. This goal is expressed in Russian calls for ‘multipolarity’ and 
endorsement of formats such as BRICS and the G20. 
This is the final pre-publication version of a manuscript to be published in Geopolitics 
Page 15 of 28 
 
A third major goal-oriented plotline relates to the ‘inevitable’ continuation of Russia’s 
cooperation with Europe. The narrative projected by Russian leaders and state media insists 
that commercial and business ties between Russia and the EU are continuing to develop, 
despite political tensions, because both sides have so much to gain from ‘pragmatic 
cooperation’.62 The end state which Russia’s leaders envisage to resolve security problems in 
Europe is a ‘single economic and humanitarian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ (a space 
which obviously attaches Europe to Russia while detaching it from the USA).63 
All the above-mentioned Russian goals have roots in the ‘great power’ or ‘European’ 
identities favoured by the Russian state. By opposing the US-led West’s ‘interference’ 
abroad, the Russian leadership hopes to block political changes – particularly in the post-
Soviet region – which might diminish the international influence which it ‘must’ as a great 
power exert. By rejecting international formats in which Russia’s preferences are overridden 
in favour of formats where Russia’s voice is louder (e.g. BRICS), the Russian leadership is 
claiming the right to be heeded which great powers ‘must’ enjoy. By pushing for greater 
economic cooperation with the EU and promoting the idea of a common space from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok, Russia is asserting its membership of Europe, while striving to minimize 
Europe’s ‘Western-ness’ – the aspect of Europe’s identity that connects with the USA and 
excludes Russia. 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot from Vesti Nedeli on 1 June 2014, showing the words 'West - sponsor of 
genocide' over an image of US President Barack Obama meeting Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk 
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In the studied political statements and media content, ‘the West’ (‘Zapad’) and the USA or 
America (‘SShA’, ‘Amerika’) often appeared to be used interchangeably. This is well 
illustrated by Figure 1, a screen shot from Vesti Nedeli, where the words ‘West – sponsor of 
genocide’ (‘Zapad – sponsor genotsida’) are superimposed on an image of US President 
Barack Obama. Russia’s strategic narrative can thus be described both as anti-Western and 
anti-American; references to the West are essentially references to the United States 
lumped together with subordinate allies. ‘Anti-Western’ in this context should not, however, 
be read as unequivocally ‘anti-European’. European countries certainly face criticism in 
Russia’s strategic narrative, but the criticism is directed above all towards their alignment 
with the USA rather than their own independent shortcomings. Whereas America’s flaws 
and misdeeds are narrated with relish and implied inevitability, Europe’s are narrated with 
regret: Europe is redeemable, America is not. 
The above analysis is based on a limited number of sources – two top politicians and one 
widely-watched TV programme – which were chosen for their prominent positions in the 
communicative apparatus of the Russian state. However, the characterisations and plotlines 
described above can be observed in the statements of other government representatives, as 
well as the numerous media outlets supported from the Russian state budget (be they news 
agencies, newspapers or broadcasters, for domestic audiences or international ones). 
The contribution of nation-branding and ‘mega-projects’ to Russia’s strategic narrative 
Negativity about the West and America is a central feature of Russia’s strategic narrative. Yet 
the Russian narrative does not exclusively consist of this kind of self-defence; it also 
incorporates some self-promotional practices of the nation-branding variety, designed partly 
to enhance the national image abroad. Between 2006 and 2015, for example, the American 
public relations firm Ketchum received tens of millions of dollars from the Russian state to 
make Russia more attractive to investors.64 Ketchum reportedly advised members of Putin’s 
inner circle on how to deal with the press and liaised between Russian officials and media 
organizations in an attempt to secure more favourable coverage. Meanwhile, so-called 
‘mega-projects’ or ‘mega-events’ have received substantial state funds to impress the world. 
Russia’s hosting of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and the 2018 FIFA World Cup are 
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examples, as are the Skolkovo technology and innovation hub founded in a Moscow suburb 
and the tourist complex being developed on Russky Island.65 The Russian state’s support for 
mega-events and mega-projects arises from, and is designed to consolidate, the great power 
aspect of its preferred self-identity. Such events and projects are supposed to demonstrate 
‘to the world as much as to oneself that Russia is still and again a force to be reckoned 
with’.66 
The self-identity which the Russian state has tried to project via these self-promotional 
efforts is still that of a ‘great power’, but it is also welcoming, cooperative and non-
threatening. ‘Russia – Great, New, Open!’ (Rossiya – Velikaya, Novaya, Otkrytaya!) was a 
slogan displayed (in Russian and English) at the Sochi Games.67 As Putin said in one 2014 
interview: 
‘The Olympics are very important for us, because I believe (and I would like it to 
be so) that the Games opened the door not only to Russia, but also to the Russian 
soul, to the hearts of our people. Others could look and see that there is nothing 
to fear, that we are open for cooperation.’68 
Moreover, Gronskaya and Makarychev highlight the (ultimately unsuccessful) ‘normalization 
agenda’ underlying Russia’s hosting of the Olympics: the Kremlin wanted to give Russia the 
reputation of a ‘normal country’ that can meet the highest international standards.69 They 
observe that the Russian understanding of normalcy is very Western-centric. In other words, 
it is Western recognition that is sought for the idea that Russia has ‘finalised its post-1991 
transition to effective statehood’ and thus won back its international status as an equal of 
other great powers.70  
The welcoming Russian self speaks English in order to engage actively and constructively 
with the wider world – even the nefarious Americans. For example, at Skoltech – a Skolkovo-
based institute of science and technology founded in 2011 with the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) as a partner – all tuition is in English, many members of the teaching 
staff have been brought in from Western universities and the aim is to attract a substantial 
number of international students onto PhD and master’s programmes. Political discourse 
relating to the creation of Skolkovo sought to downplay the difference between ‘ours’ and 
‘outsiders’ and make the idea of foreigners working in Russia compatible with Russian 
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patriotism.71 Like other Russian mega-projects, Skolkovo was designed to have an appealing 
visual impact. Kinossian and Morgan argue that its creators were hoping to recreate ‘images 
of Western urbanism inspired by ‘global-city’ thinking’.72 
The Skolkovo project was launched and prioritised by former Russian president Dmitriy 
Medvedev; it has undoubtedly become less prominent in Russia’s strategic narrative since 
Putin resumed his presidential role and it appears to have fallen victim to power struggles 
between conservative and liberal factions in the Russian elite.73 Nevertheless, it remains a 
recipient of considerable government funding. Moreover, the 2014 Sochi Olympics and the 
2018 World Cup are very much Putin-backed and Putin-led initiatives which emphasize the 
same open, welcoming and non-threatening aspects of Russia’s character. When presenting 
Russia’s bid for the 2018 World Cup, Sports Minister Vitaliy Mutko struggled to speak ‘frrom 
my khart’ in English,74 but joked that by 2018 he would speak English ‘like my friend Jack 
Thompson’.75 The message that Russia and Russians have a sense of humour and are willing 
to poke fun at themselves was again conveyed (wordlessly) in the Sochi 2014 closing 
ceremony, at which a much-discussed technical malfunction from the opening ceremony 
(the non-appearance of one of the five Olympic rings) was deliberately recreated for laughs.  
The desire to project a welcoming and open Russian identity stems partially from economic 
goals. Modernization and international competitiveness are still considered necessary by the 
Russian leadership, which sees a chance to boost national economic performance by 
attracting foreign investors,76 partners for development and visitors more generally. An 
analysis at the ‘thin’ end of the spectrum of persuasion would interpret the mega-events and 
megaprojects as attempts to exert behavioural power, with international economic elites 
the primary target. 
At the same time, the Russian state is motivated to characterise itself as welcoming and 
open by the potential collective self-esteem that could ensue from praise in international 
public discourse. Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Kozak claimed that the Sochi 
Olympics had ‘broken the ice of scepticism towards the new Russia’, making Russia, its 
culture and people ‘into something that is a lot closer, more appealing and understandable 
for the rest of the world’.77 As the next section argues, one might read this claim as wishful 
thinking. 
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Responses to Russia’s strategic narrative 
How effectively has the Russian state defended and promoted its preferred self-identity in 
its strategic narrative? Miskimmon et al. suggest that success in strategic narrative entails 
getting audiences ‘to experience the world’ through your preferred narrative and rendering 
it plausible to the extent that it is ‘commonsensical and not even noticed’.78 Yet not all 
audiences are equal. Internationally, achieving the acceptance of a narrative among opinion 
leaders (such as journalists) and decision-makers (such as investors or foreign politicians) is 
likely to be more rewarding than achieving acceptance among people who are less 
influential and less visible. Responses in some parts of the world may be valued more highly 
than responses in other parts of the world. Even domestically, securing a consensus around 
the state’s strategic narrative may matter most in the social strata that have greatest 
political weight or the most to contribute economically. Scholarly and public discussions of 
soft power and the images of different countries usually fail to discriminate between 
different audiences and their relative significance to national strategic goals. There is an 
unfortunate tendency to quantify countries’ soft power at an overall global level, or proclaim 
national images ‘positive’ or otherwise, without acknowledging that perceptions of any 
country inevitably vary hugely from place and group to group, while places and groups in 
turn vary in their significance to the prosperity and security of the country in question. 
Soft power is regarded as a phenomenon of the international arena, with domestic 
audiences being of limited relevance. Yet strategic narratives are meant to work at home as 
well as abroad and the Russian electorate is certainly an audience of paramount importance 
to the Kremlin. Domestic acceptance of the strategic narrative is not only a matter of 
perpetuating authoritarian rule, even though it probably does facilitate the political 
leadership’s hold on power. Domestic consensus around the strategic narrative is integral to 
the process of realising the leadership’s preferred state identity – no less so than 
international recognition. The leadership’s claims that Russia is a European great power ring 
hollow unless the Russian people themselves recognise and accept it as such. 
On the domestic front, the Russian strategic narrative appears to be achieving the intended 
reaction. Survey data reveals close alignment between the views of the general population 
and the state’s narrative concerning itself and others. For instance, a survey conducted in 
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late September 2014 found that 79 per cent of respondents viewed the united position 
adopted by Western countries towards Russia’s Ukraine policy as evidence of ‘the USA and 
the West trying to pressurize Russia and weaken Russian influence in the world’ rather than 
criticism of Russia being justified.79 Russians have little doubt that their country occupies the 
moral high ground: in October 2014 a poll found that some 68 per cent felt their country was 
playing a positive role in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.80 Some 44 per cent of Russians 
believe that global respect for Russia has increased in the past decade, against 22 per cent 
who say it has fallen.81 
In contrast, Russia’s strategic narrative seems much less effective on the international front. 
In international coverage of the Sochi Olympics, the ‘appealing, understandable’ Russia 
struggled for traction against a Russia of ‘homophobia, human rights abuses and corruption’ 
– not to mention a Russia accused of imperialist ambitions towards its neighbours.82 Anholt 
writes that enhancement of a nation-brand requires coherence between ‘strategy, 
substance, and symbolic actions’.83 The Kremlin had arranged a major symbolic action, but 
the message symbolized (tolerance, openness, normalcy) clashed with visible substance, 
such as crackdowns against protesters. Domestically such issues could be kept out of the 
public eye, but not internationally. 
Despite wavering in some quarters, European political leaders have for the most part vocally 
condemned Russia for being authoritarian at home and aggressive in foreign policy. As for 
potential investors, sanctions are likely to outweigh any positive impressions generated by 
Russia’s nation-branding initiatives. At a 2015 investment forum in Sochi, organizers wore 
‘Keep Calm and Do Business in Russia’ t-shirts, implicitly acknowledging this problem.84 
Meanwhile, survey data indicates that Russia is still very much viewed as the hostile other by 
ordinary Europeans. A YouGov poll in March 2014 found that 53 per cent of British and 
French respondents and 61 per cent of Germans agreed with the statement that ‘Russia 
today has an aggressive foreign policy and is actively trying to control or take territory off 
neighbouring countries’. In all seven European countries surveyed, over 40 per cent of 
respondents felt that Russia posed a military threat to the West, against 17 to 29 per cent 
who felt it did not.85 Similarly, the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project found the 
proportion of respondents declaring an ‘unfavourable’ view of Russia in spring 2014 had 
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risen above 70 per cent in Europe and the USA (Greece was the only European country 
where favourable views of Russia were in the majority).86  
The survey data cited above has limitations as a measure of narrative reception. Items about 
how ‘favourably’ Russia is viewed are not ideal proxies for assessing the more specific 
identity qualities which the Russian state projects (greatness, openness and so on). 
Moreover, most survey questionnaires allow only a limited number of response options, so 
respondents may be directed towards endorsing narratives that reflect the pollster’s 
reasoning more than their own. In the current repressive political climate, it is possible that 
some Russian survey respondents might be too wary to answer honestly when asked 
political questions. However, on that point, recent work by Frye, Gehlbach and Reuter offers 
reassurance: they used a ‘list experiment’ to gauge whether Russians were expressing their 
genuine opinions in sensitive survey items and discovered only a small degree of social 
desirability bias.87 
Overall, on the available evidence, Russia’s strategic narrative about its identity does look 
like it is failing internationally if identity-recognition from Europe and the West matter to 
Russia in the way scholars claim.88 In fact, Russian self-promotional efforts have fallen so far 
short of impressing Europeans and other Westerners that one might conclude the Russian 
policy-makers responsible are either incompetent, or not seriously pursuing this aim. 
Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that the competitive projection of state identities is not 
exclusively a matter of benign attraction as the ‘soft power’ framework implies. Promotional 
measures like ‘nation-branding’, designed to attract, are only one aspect of competition to 
secure desired identities in international relations. Defensive measures, which may involve 
state-led attacks on the identities of critical other states via official pronouncements and the 
mass media, are also important. The strategic narrative framework allows both these 
aspects of state identity communication to be studied together, and thus aids holistic 
analysis of whether attempts to secure desired identities are succeeding. 
In the case of Russia, it appears that the state’s efforts to defend its European and great 
power identities by denigrating the West and the USA are undermining its efforts to 
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promote an open, welcoming identity through nation-branding to international audiences. 
When Russia’s politicians and state media generate exaggerated anti-Western 
denouncements, this is observed from abroad and slotted into prevailing Western 
narratives, according to which Russia is authoritarian and aggressive rather than a good 
place to visit or do business. 
The gulf between the international reception of Russia’s strategic narrative and its domestic 
reception can be partly attributed to different media environments. Within Russia, the 
state’s strategic narrative is mediated by multiple, uncritical and widely-consumed TV 
channels, newspapers, radio stations and websites, while rival narratives are suppressed. 
Elsewhere, Russia’s strategic narrative is mediated by foreign journalists working for news 
outlets without any particular loyalty to the Russian state. Although the Russian state has 
some media of its own for delivering its narrative to foreign audiences (e.g. RT and Sputnik, 
which project more or less the same narrative as the sources studied in this article), their 
impact is limited by their low profile and market share relative to outlets carrying alternative 
and incompatible narratives about Russia. Of course, narrative reception is not determined 
by media exposure alone – pre-existing attitudes towards the ‘narrating’ state based on 
historical or other experiences are also influential. 
The fact that Russian leaders are doing relatively little to address international rejection of 
their strategic narrative reflects the order of their priorities. Unlike the soft power 
framework, the strategic narrative framework acknowledges that state-led identity 
projection is targeted at domestic audiences as well as foreign ones. Within Russia itself, the 
state’s strategic narrative seems to be effective: it is widely accepted and reproduced,89 
allowing Russian citizens to continue perceiving their country as ‘great’ and its tensions with 
Europe attributable to malign American influence rather than any lack of ‘European-ness’. 
The Russian leadership is placing a higher value on the reactions of its domestic audience 
than the reactions of international audiences. This may be partly due to the leaders’ desire 
to stay in power, but it is also a matter of maximising collective self-esteem. Zarakol argues 
that Russia is engaged in a perpetual quest for parity with the ‘established’, ‘more 
developed’ West, with its self-esteem dependent on receiving acceptance and inclusive 
treatment from Western states.90 Yet for the Russian elite and public, there is perhaps 
greater collective self-esteem and ontological security to be derived from defying Western 
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criticism, and from interpreting such defiance as evidence of their country’s great power 
status. The acceptance which Russia would like from Western states pertains to its right to 
be ‘equal but different’, not ‘equal and part of the liberal democratic club’. While such 
acceptance is not forthcoming, tensions are likely to continue. 
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